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1704 1/2 South Congress, Suite P
Austin TX 78759
(512) 912 1327
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Quarterly Market Report Continued

Birnbaum argues that the legislature ordinarily excludes insurers when defining the term "financial institution." This conclusion is based on a survey of fifteen Texas statutes that exclude insurers from the term "financial institutions." [FN10] Birnbaum concedes that there are two "aberrational" statutes that do include insurance companies within the definition of "financial institutions," [FN11] but attempts to distinguish these statutes on the ground that the definition would clearly exclude automobile insurers even if other insurers were included.

FN10. See Tex. Prop.Code. Ann. §§ 141.002(7), 162.005(5) (West Supp.1999); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 481.401(2) (West 1998); Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 360, § 1(2) (West Supp.1998); Tex. Fin.Code. Ann. §§ 15.204(c), 31.002(a)(25), 59.301(7), 91.002(14), and 302.105(b)(1) (West 1998); Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 26.02(a)(1) (West.Supp.1999); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 30.007(a)(2) (West 1997); Tex. Ins.Code Ann. art. 21.57(a)(2) (West Supp.1999); Tex. Prob.Code Ann. § § 241(b), 436(3) (West Supp.1999).

FN11. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.01(1) (West 1994); Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1528g, § 1(3) (West 1997).

Appellees rejoin that insurance companies are inherently "financial institutions" by virtue of their services, which consist of accepting premiums, investing the funds, and paying out money to customers in the form of claim payments. Appellees also provide two dictionary definitions that include insurance companies among examples of "financial institutions." [FN12] On these grounds, appellees assert they have established that the ordinary meaning of "financial institutions" includes insurance companies.

FN12. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 851 (Philip B. Gove ed., 1981); Black's Law Dictionary 630 (6th ed.1990).

The reasons marshaled by the parties prove only that the term "financial institution" admits of more than one ordinary meaning. The statutes cited by Birnbaum do not control in this instance. Each such statute defines "financial institution" in a statutory context that does not logically pertain to insurance companies. [FN13]

FN13. See, e.g., Tex. Fin.Code Ann. §§ 15.204, 59.202 & 59.301 (West 1998) (relating to regulation of banking firms); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 481.401 (West 1998) (enacting program to secure loans to business and non- profit organizations).

Nor are we persuaded by appellees' dictionary definitions. At least one of the definitions reflects merely the existence of a federal statutory definition of "financial institution." See Black's Law Dictionary 630 (6th ed.1990) (citing 31 U.S.C.A § 5312; Uniform Probate Code § 6- 101(3)). Moreover, two reputable dictionaries contain no definition of "financial institution," suggesting that the expression, as such, has no certain meaning in ordinary usage. See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (William Morris ed., 1973); The Random House College Dictionary (revised ed., 1984).

We conclude that the meaning of the term "financial institution," as used in the statute, is uncertain as to whether it was intended to include insurance companies. In deciding the issue, we must therefore give the statute a reasonable construction that is consistent with the whole of the statute and its purpose and objective. See Ex parte Pruitt, 551 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tex.1977); City of Mason v. West Texas Utils. Co., 237 S.W.2d 273, 278 (Tex.1951); Fleming Foods v. Sharp, 951 S.W.2d 278, 281 (Tex.App.--Austin 1997, pet. granted).

We find at the beginning of the statute a broad statement of general legislative intent. Section 552.001(a) articulates the policy and purpose of the Texas Public Information Act:

[I]t is the policy of this state that each person is entitled, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, at all times to complete information about the affairs of government and the official acts of public officials and employees.... The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created. The provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed to implement this policy.

Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 552.001(a) (West 1994) (emphasis added). In addition to this statement of a general policy, the legislature indicated a wish that the statute "be liberally construed in favor of granting a request for information." Id. § 552.001(b).

In light of the clearly expressed general purpose of ensuring that the public retains effective control of government, appellees bear a significant burden of persuasion that the legislature intended an expansive interpretation of a statutory exception that operates against the general purpose of the statute.

Appellees assert that the longstanding position of the Attorney General--that insurance companies are "financial institutions" within the meaning of section 552.112--must be presumed to have been understood by the legislature and implicitly adopted each time the statute was reenacted. We disagree. The well-settled rule is that a legislature presumably adopts judicial interpretations of an act when a statute is reenacted without material change. See Coastal Indus. Water Auth. v. Trinity Portland Cement Div., Gen. Portland Cement Co., 563 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex.1978). Attorney General opinions are not judicial interpretations; they are not controlling on the courts. See Commissioners Court v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77, 82 (Tex.1997); City of San Antonio v. Texas Att'y Gen., 851 S.W.2d 946, 950 (Tex.App.--Austin 1993, writ denied) ("The attorney general's opinions ... are purely ministerial and advisory."). Nor are they controlling on the legislature. See 2B Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 49.09, at 69 (5th ed. 1992) ("When Congress reenacts an earlier statute, the presumption is that it knows and approves prior judicial constructions of that act by state courts.") (emphasis added). Furthermore, nothing suggests that the legislature was aware of the Attorney General's interpretation of "financial institution" when it reenacted the statute. "[R]eenactment of [a statute] to which an administrative interpretation or regulation pertains should not make the administrative ruling automatically binding as law without evidence that clearly manifests such a purpose." Id. at 69-70 (emphasis added). [FN14]

FN14. The case of Rainbow Group, Ltd. v. Texas Employment Commission, 897 S.W.2d 946 (Tex.App.--Austin 1995, writ denied), is consistent with this general rule. In Rainbow Group, we assumed that the legislature adopted an Attorney General interpretation when it recodified a Texas statute that had been construed in an Attorney General Open Records Decision. See id. at 949. In that case, there was specific evidence that the legislature had taken notice of the Attorney General opinion interpreting the statute when the legislature modified the statute using language from the opinion. See id. In the case at bar, by contrast, the language of the state exemption is taken verbatim from the language of an exemption in a federal statute, and there is no evidence that the legislature incorporated Attorney General opinions into its intended meaning of the term "financial institution."

The Attorney General's position that the term "financial institutions" includes insurance companies was based in part on an analogy to an unrelated statute. [FN15] The Attorney General also relied on the definition provided in Webster's Third International Dictionary, which we have rejected as authoritative in this context. Finally, the Attorney General looked to the legislative history of the Act, and found the testimony of an insurance commissioner wherein he requested that an exception be made for insurance companies. Nothing indicates that the legislature intended any particular response to that request in the language that body chose to place in the statute. The insurance industry's position on how the statute should be interpreted is therefore not persuasive. We decline to follow the Attorney General's interpretation.

FN15. See Tex. Att'y Gen. ORD-158 (1977) (citing Tex. Bus.Code Art. 1528(g)).

With nothing definite before us regarding the legislature's intention, we look for guidance to the analogous federal Freedom of Information Act. Section 552.112 was modeled after exception eight of the Freedom of Information Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8) (1996). Federal decisions construing exceptions to the Freedom of Information Act are instructive in our interpretation of the Texas Public Information Act. See A & T Consultants, Inc. v. Sharp, 904 S.W.2d 668, 676 (Tex.1995); City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 969 S.W.2d 548, 557 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1998, writs granted).

In an opinion interpreting the federal statute, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia noted the sparse legislative history that accompanied exception eight. See Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Heimann, 589 F.2d 531, 539 (D.C.Cir.1978). However, the court was able to discern two reasons for the exception. The exception was intended primarily "to insure the security and integrity of financial institutions, for the sensitive details collected by Government agencies which regulate these institutions could, if indiscriminately disclosed, cause great harm." Id. at 534 n.10 (quoting U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1966, pp. 2418, 2428). Exception eight was designed also to encourage compliance with government regulations, by ensuring the confidentiality of information provided by financial institutions pursuant to those regulations. See id.

Neither purpose is furthered in this instance by protecting Quarterly Market Reports from disclosure. First, the harm that appellees fear is competition, not harm that involves directly the security of the institution itself or the industry. [FN16] There is no showing or contention that release of the Quarterly Market Reports is likely to injure the security or integrity of insurance companies. Second, the objective of encouraging compliance with government regulations is for the benefit of the government, not the regulated institutions. Because of the exception, government may withhold from mandatory disclosure information supplied by private entities on the ground that disclosure might jeopardize government's ability to collect such information in the future. But here the State officials wish to disclose the reports. They apparently have determined that the public interest in disclosure outweighs any applicable regulatory interest in assuring that regulated insurers comply with reporting requirements.

FN16. While the court in Consumers Union seemed to acknowledge that harm to financial institutions could encompass competitive harm from other banks, see Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Heimann, 589 U.S. 531, 540 (D.C.Cir.1978), we believe the exception for trade secrets is more pointedly designed to protect against such harm. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 552.110 (West 1994). Historically, federal courts have been willing to limit the scope of the Freedom of Information Act. Texas courts have declined to follow suit. See Industrial Found. of the South, Inc. v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 682 (Tex.1976) ("We decline to adopt an interpretation which would allow the court in its discretion to deny disclosure even though there is no specific exemption provided."); Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Gilbreath, 842 S.W.2d 408, 413 (Tex.App.-- Austin 1992, no writ).

Finally, section 552.112 is a permissive exception only. Even if the exception applies to the Quarterly Market Reports, the State officials may reject the exception and disclose the information to the public. This power is given in section 552.007, which states as follows: "This chapter does not prohibit a governmental body ... from voluntarily making part or all of its information available to the public, unless disclosure is expressly prohibited by law or the information is confidential under law." Tex. Gov't Code. Ann. § 552.007(a) (West Supp.1999). A government agency may therefore release any information that is not expressly prohibited from release on the grounds indicated. See id. §§ 552.110, .112; Industrial Found. of the South, Inc., 540 S.W.2d 668, 682-83 (Tex.1976).

Appellees argue that a better reading of section 552.007 would allow the government to disclose its own documents, but not documents in which there is a third-party property or privacy interest. Appellees advocate a distinction not suggested by the language of the statute. Some kinds of information given to a State agency will undoubtedly be confidential. For example, if the appellees' filings amounted to a trade secret or confidential or privileged information under section 552.110, they would be confidential under law and therefore could not be disclosed under section 552.007. But we find no authority for the proposition that section 552.112 itself creates a class of information that is confidential under law because it was furnished to the State by private entities. The fact that information is excepted from mandatory disclosure does not necessarily render it confidential. When the legislature has intended to make information confidential, it has not hesitated to so provide in express terms. See, e.g., Tex. Ins.Code Ann. art. 1.24D (making explicit the confidentiality of underwriting guidelines and stating that a violation of this section is a violation of the open-records law); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 552.113(a), (c) (West Supp.1999) (excepting geological or geophysical information that is defined as confidential); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 82.009 (West 1992) (ensuring confidentiality of medical records).

Because we hold as a matter of law that insurance companies are not "financial institutions" within the meaning of section 552.112, [FN17] and that section 552.112 is a permissive exception that government may waive in its discretion, we reverse the summary judgment and dissolve the permanent injunction. See Risk Managers Int'l v. State, 858 S.W.2d 567, 569-70 (Tex.App.--Austin 1993, writ denied).

FN17. Our decision that insurance companies are not "financial institutions" for the purposes of section 552.112 renders it unnecessary for us to determine whether Quarterly Market Reports are operating or condition reports within the meaning of section 552.112.

Temporary Injunction

Our reversal of the permanent-injunction order moots one ground for the temporary injunction, but the other ground--that the Quarterly Market Reports are trade secrets--survives. Because we find the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a temporary injunction on this ground, we affirm the temporary injunction order. We will explain our reasons.

The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo of the subject matter of the suit pending final disposition of the case on its merits. See Janus Films, Inc. v. City of Fort Worth, 358 S.W.2d 589, 589 (Tex.1962). To obtain a temporary injunction, the applicant must show a probable right to the relief sought and probable injury in the interim before trial. See Niemeyer v. Tana Oil & Gas Corp., 952 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tex.App.--Austin 1997, no writ). Probable injury is demonstrated by evidence of imminent harm, irreparable injury, and an inadequate legal remedy. See Miller Paper Co. v. Roberts Paper Co., 901 S.W.2d 593, 597 (Tex.App.-- Amarillo 1995, no writ). A trial court order granting a temporary injunction may be reversed only for a clear abuse of discretion. See Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 57-58 (Tex.1993); Iranian Muslim Org. v. City of San Antonio, 615 S.W.2d 202, 208 (Tex.1981).

Equal Access. In his first issue on appeal from the temporary injunction, Birnbaum argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying him access to the Quarterly Market Reports while permitting their release to TAIPA. In granting the temporary injunction, the trial court found that appellees would suffer immediate, irreparable injury if the Department released to "the public" Quarterly Market Report information for the first quarter of 1996, the second quarter of 1996, or any subsequent quarter. To prevent this harm, the temporary injunction order restrains the Department from directly or indirectly releasing the Quarterly Market Report information to any person or entity but provides that the Department

may provide access to the number of vehicles on policies at end of previous and current quarters of the Quarterly Market Report Data to the Texas Automobile Insurance Plan Association and Auto Insurance Plan Service Office (AIPSO), only, solely to the extent required for making calculations necessary to implement the incentive programs described section 3(e) of the Texas Insurance Code, article 21.81.

Appellees contend the temporary injunction allows the Department and "its statistical agents" to perform calculations necessary to the implementation of incentive programs "without public disclosure." Appellees argue that if the Quarterly Market Report information is released to a member of the public such as Birnbaum, competitors will be able to acquire the information, ascertain appellees' marketing strategies, and develop their own marketing plans to appellees' detriment. Birnbaum contends that because the temporary injunction allows the Department to provide the information to TAIPA, [FN18] an association of automobile insurers and a member of the public, the information is necessarily available to the appellees' competitors.

FN18. AIPSO, an agent of TAIPA, is not discussed in the record. We will refer to both entities as "TAIPA."

TAIPA's fifteen-member governing body consists of eight persons elected by the member insurers, five public members nominated by the Office of Public Insurance Counsel and selected by the Commissioner of Insurance, and two local recording agents. See Tex. Ins.Code Ann. art. 21.81, § 2(b) (West Supp.1999). TAIPA is thus a private entity, in a sense, with a governing body that is largely private. See Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 486 (Tex.1997) (Hecht, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment). TAIPA's powers are limited. See id. The entity's powers, however, are exercised for a public purpose and in the public interest. In accordance with the plan of operation, TAIPA may make assessments against member companies in proportion to their writing of motor-vehicle liability insurance in Texas, collect funds from member companies to provide for operation of the association, and report to the Commission any failure to pay assessments. See id.

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